Can Europe’s Navies Deter Russia Alone?

The prospect of reducing the US military and military support has raised the bells all over the continent. In particular, European NATO should now think whether it can only restrain or defeat Russia.

The fears of Russia’s ability to act against maritime lines of communication, geographically isolated parts of the continent, and Russia’s fighting experience, which was faked in the war with Ukraine, means that the risks are true.

But there is also a danger that they overcome rational opinion and too much count on historical views on Russia, which can already be true.

In recent years, European naval marine marine marine marine marine naval maritime marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine maritime marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine marine. On the contrary, the Russian fleet acted in the war of Ukraine quite poorly and was forced to rely on the shrinking group of smaller and less capable vessels than before.

History also suggests that the bad strategic geography of Russia can manipulate well -directed marine forces to contain aggression.

There are deficiencies for both the US and Europe in separation. Russia supports the formidable hand submarine, and Europeans will have difficulties if they had to face these vessels without US support. In terms of the United States, on the other hand, in Europe engaged in Europe, these courts will make these courts and opportunities inaccessible to support the United States in the Indo-Pacific conflict, where it is now exceeding China.

Does the Russian Military Fleet present a similar threat to the Soviet fleet of the Cold War?

Putin’s naval fleet has significant niche possibilities, in particular, its submarine, mentioned above, but otherwise is the pale shadow of the greatness of the Soviet era. In 1985, the Russians entered more than 380 submarines of all types; Today it has less than 65 such vessels, and they are geographically scattered.

His Black Sea fleet demonstrated poor readiness and tactical skills, especially since his controversial defeat in the Black Sea is coastal Ukrainian drone and missile forces. There are also problems in the broader fleet of Russia. Its single air carrier does not work for more than five years, and many of its large, Soviet epochs of battles remain under refurbishment or do not work. Russian nuclear submarines remain threatened and have appeared in the Atlantic region much more often in recent years.

Given this, the Russian submarine is not enough to threaten the Atlantic Marine Communication. Even during the Cold War, the Soviet fleet had no significant mission to attack NATO. Today’s Russian fleet is more poorly equipped to fulfill this mission and does not even affect it in its latest strategic document as significant efforts. The last Russian maritime strategy is focused on protecting the Russian homeland with limited maritime potential in “next to the border”. This does not include the finicky lines of the North Atlantic Sea.

What about the European Military Potential?

European military -marital forces decreased in the number, as in the US and Russia, from the end of the Cold War, but the collective and strategic mobility of these units exceed the geographically isolated Russian fleet in the high north, the Baltic and Black Sea.

New marine technology is also guaranteed a role. For example, the Royal Fleet finances a $ 500 million program called Project Cabot to use drones and increased vehicles to fill the gaps left by the lack of high -class dishes. The unscrewed units can be much cheaper and so numerous.

Russia’s nuclear submarines remain a critical threat. The northern fleet is the

most capable of Russia with a five-cruise missile and eight nuclear shell submarines among its rows. Combined Military -Marine forces of other Atlantic and Arctic European countries boast 10 submarines nuclear attacks (all of them French and British.) Europeans lack both nuclear and ordinary submarines compared to Russians in the critical mounds/Norwegian Sea In the war.

Past wars suggest a European strategy for Russia’s confrontation.

Russia’s geography has always made it vulnerable to sea -based action. During the Crimean War in 1853-1855. British and French combat operations, sealed with critical Russian ports not only in the Black Sea, but also in the Baltic States, depriving Russia critical imports and denying its ability to export key goods such as wheat and wood.

The inability to move wheat from the Black Sea in the First World War helped to crack the collapse of imperial Russia. The end of the Cold War worsened these traditional Russian problems in the Baltic States and the Black Sea, reducing the number of shoreline and port objects and bases available for Russian use. The blockade of Russian imports and exports, in particular, oil and wheat, or a threat to this, can be useful for restraint of Russian aggression. The Russians know this weakness and are noted in their maritime strategy in 2022.

The way forward?

Undoubtedly, Europe will be challenged when harvesting a coordinated force necessary for repulsion of Russian aggression, but its naval forces are highly professional and well coordinated through NATO learning. They can succeed in curb and, if necessary, winning Russian military -marital forces.

The lack of support for the US nuclear submarine is the only critical maritime drawback that can affect the ability to restrain Russian aggression. European NATO should be corrected to hold back and eventually defeat Russia.

Currently, Dr. Stephen Wils serves as a military -maritime strategy at the US Navy. He is an expert in the strategy and policy of the US Navy. Wils had a 20-year career as an active US Navy officer in the sea and on shore assignments at the NATO Defense Agency.

The edge of Europe It is a CEPA online magazine that covers important topics on foreign policy across Europe and North America. All opinions are author’s and do not necessarily present the position and views of the institutions they represent, or the Center for European Policy.